Showing posts sorted by relevance for query tino. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query tino. Sort by date Show all posts

January 5, 2011

Does spending more on education improve test scores?

Conservatives have been saying for a long time that spending more on schools doesn't raise test scores: just look at how much D.C. spends per student or how much the U.S. spends versus Finland.

But Tino at Super-Economy crunches the test scores (PISA internationally and NAEP in the U.S.) after adjusting for demographics, and finds positive correlations between spending and test scores:
However the left in the United States doesn't use this argument, because they are ideologically averse to demographic adjustments having to do with race and ethnicity (most of them consider all statistical generalizations about race and ethnicity somehow offensive, regardless of why you are doing it).

The result of liberals' political correctness is that they are depriving themselves of a very important argument in a very important debate.

True, but there are other adjustments that need to be made, such as for cost-of-living and/or wealth. Compared to Mississippi, New Jersey has expensive public schools, but then it's an expensive place to live full of expensive people. In Tino's comments, I suggest a few methodological wrinkles he should add.

In general, Americans spend a lot of money on schools. The architecture and landscaping of American colleges, for example, is often absurdly lavish. Do expensive buildings raise, say, LSAT scores among individual undergrads, as opposed to attracting better applicants? 

Probably not much. Other reasons are more important, such as social climbing, monument building, regional pride, and so forth. One reason that's often overlooked is that school isn't just preparation for life, it is part of life. For example, Rice has a lavish campus due to the generosity of some rich people and I appreciated my four years admiring the aesthetics that they had arranged for my edification. Similarly, one point of hiring high quality teachers is to have your kids talked to by high quality people.

A reader writes:

Of the 8,320 people who took the GRE between July 1, 2005, and June 30, 2008, and indicated that Secondary Education was their chosen field of graduate study, exactly *zero* scored an 800 on the verbal test.

Of the 5,901 people who indicated that Elementary Education was their chosen field of study, *zero* scored an 800 on the verbal test.

And of the 1,521 people who indicated that Early Childhood Education was their chosen field of study, *zero* scored an 800 on the verbal test. 

If you widen the net to catch those in the 700-790 range, the results aren't much better. I think this supports the conventional wisdom (or is it the conventional unconventional wisdom?) that teaching in the U.S. is low-status and low-pay, so it inevitably attracts the low performers among the college-educated. Improving the quality of our public schools is contingent upon changing the composition of the teaching pool.
I scored an 800 on the GRE verbal section, but I attend, however improbably, a mid-tier education school in a master's program. Most classes are a waste of time, and insulting to my intelligence, to boot. I was dismayed enough last fall to send off a fusillade of applications to law schools and PhD programs in history. I will do a round of student teaching at a Chicago public magnet school, and then probably bolt.  

I think this is a big, unspoken problem: teacher indoctrination in  Ed Schools and in professional development can be painful to self-respecting intelligent, independent minded people. It's hard to get first rate people to be teachers when they have to put up with so much inanity to earn their credentials.
My publishe articles are archived at iSteve.com -- Steve Sailer

December 22, 2010

More PISA in Perspective

At Super-Economy, Tino takes another crack at PISA scores, putting up graphs that overcome two of the weaknesses I pointed out in my own PISA graph: I could only find scores for America by race for 2009 for reading (and Americans overall did better on reading in 2009 than on science and math), and I used national average scores for other mostly white countries. So, Tino compares the average of reading, math, and science for white Americans to Europeans who are not first or second generation immigrants to come up with a good apples to apples comparison. Finland is still well in the lead (546), but the U.S. comes in seventh (524) out of 27 European-origin countries, well ahead of, for example, the EU-15 average for wealthy Western European countries (506).

That sounds about right. There's a lot of evidence that the U.S. spends a lot on education and get at least something in return. Not great, but not bad either.

Remember, there is, inevitably, a lot of noise in PISA scores, so fine comparisons aren't too reliable. 

June 29, 2009

UPDATED: Mr. Ritholtz has a question

In this afternoon's comments on my morning post offering to debate him on whether or not "Diversity was a major factor in the mortgage meltdown," investment adviser, blogger (The Big Picture), and author of Bailout Nation: How Greed and Easy Money Corrupted Wall Street and Shook the World Economy Barry Ritholtz asks:
Ritholtz said...

How about some evidence, hard data, facts?

Or are you more comfortable with nudges, hunches and squishy junk.

Show me some hard evidence!

Mr. Ritholtz apparently hasn't been paying attention here, but I also fear I've overloaded my regular readers so much on the topic of diversity and mortgages over the last couple of years that many would rather hear that I'm about to start a new 9-part series on track & field statistics (my all-time least popular obsession) than hear the same old same old about diversity and the mortgage meltdown.

So, I'll just link to a few highlights in chronological order. The data piles up as we get closer to the present, but it's helpful to understand how my thinking evolved from the point when I had no idea what I was talking about regarding mortgages.

Let's begin with my first blog post on the subject on August 12, 2007, a couple of weeks into the subprime collapse, where you can see my hesitancy to get involved in a topic where I didn't know anything, but I did remember a few things that almost everybody else seemed to have forgotten:
A trillion here, a trillion there, pretty soon we're talking about real money
I'm sure the private financial markets were quite capable of blowing up a big bubble by themselves in the eternal see-saw struggle between greed and fear, but this political pressure for lending to minorities with doubtful credit must have exacerbated the problem. About half of all mortgages for blacks and Hispanics are subprime, versus about one-sixth for whites.

A reader has sent me some links to articles from 5 to 9 years ago to show me I'm not hallucinating about what I remember. The first are from early in this decade about Fannie Mae's big plans for boosting mortgages for minorities. Now, I don't pretend to understand what Fannie Mae is (but does anybody?). It's some kind of quasi-governmental publicly-traded for-profit thinga-ma-bob, but Fannie Mae's past pronouncements do make interesting reading at present.

Straightforward tax-and-spend programs were out of favor in the 1990s, but lean-on-lenders for the benefit of your political constituents is always in season...

Next, there's my June 22, 2008 Taki's Magazine article, The Diversity Recession, where I finally began to pull my thoughts together into a semblance of a thesis about just how manifold was the involvement of diversity on the mortgage meltdown:

The Diversity Recession

Uncovering the roots of the disastrous home mortgage bubble that popped last year will keep economic historians busy for decades. Yet, one factor has so far been largely overlooked: the bipartisan social engineering crusade to drive up the rate of homeownership by handing out more mortgages to minorities.

More than a negligible amount of the blame for the mortgage meltdown can be traced back to multiculturalism: government-mandated affirmative-action lending, demographic change, illegal immigration, and the mind-numbing effects of political correctness.

The chickens have finally come home to roost...


In VDARE.com on September 28, 2008, I explained how one central element in the housing bubble, President Bush's message to federal regulators to loosen up on zero down mortgages and liar loans in the name of increasing minority homeownership by 5.5 million households at his October 15, 2002 White House Conference on Minority Homeownership, was tied to the Karl Rove's grand strategy of wooing Hispanic voters to the GOP:
... some of the conservative talking heads tended to put forward naïve, self-serving, or unpersuasive versions of this theory—such as that the banking crash wasn't the fault of greed in the financial industry, it was the result of the Democrats in Congress passing the anti-redlining Community Reinvestment Act in 1977.

The reality is that blame is very widely shared: among Democrats and Republicans, businesspeople and politicians, Congress and the Executive Branch, borrowers and lenders, and whites, blacks and Hispanics.

There's one man, however, who has so far escaped any blame. Few have realized something that turns out to have been staring us in the face all along: that the mortgage mess was, in sizable measure, an outgrowth of the primary political goal of the Bush Administration.

That man's name is Karl Rove.

And the primary political goal of President George W. Bush's political strategist: to bring Hispanics into the Republican Party.

As you'll recall, Rove's best-known tactic to appeal to Latino voters was repeatedly pushing "comprehensive immigration reform" (i.e., an amnesty for illegal immigrants).Rove, though, had other arrows in his quiver. One was a plan to turn Hispanics into Republicans by providing them with loose credit so they could become homeowners...

Then, "Tino" introduced me to the key source for numbers, the Federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act database. The federal government carefully tracks how much minorities are getting in mortgage dollars (but not, of course, whether they are paying them back). I blogged on October 10, 2008:
Tino has added up all the subprime mortgage dollars for the entire disastrous 2004-2007 period. Among borrowers whose ethnicity is unambiguous, he comes up with $900 billion subprime dollars going to non-Hispanic whites, $887 billion to minorities. So, that's 50% of subprime dollars during the worst years of the Bubble went to minorities.

Someday, we'll get a count of defaulted dollars by race.

On January 21, 2009, I posted a graph I had made up from data of a Boston Fed study of every subprime default in Massachusetts showing that Non-Asian Minority subprime default rates average about twice the white rate over the years.

So, in Massachusetts, the Non-Asian Minority foreclosure rate on subprime mortgages was about twice the white rate. That didn't change too much over the years, but the proportion of mortgages that were subprime and the proportion of mortgage dollars going to minorities changed radically in the Bush years, contributing sizably to the disastrous mortgage meltdown that began in 2007 and triggered the more general crash of 2008.

If that two to one minority to white foreclosure ratio seen in Massachusetts holds true nationally, where minorities took out half the subprime dollars, then minorities would account for two-thirds of all defaulted subprime dollars.

However, Asians probably have a lower default rate. On the other hand, they largely stayed away from subprime mortgages, so it's not a big issue. So, it's likely that minorities accounted for at least 60% of the subprime dollars defaulted.

In VDARE.com on February 1, 2009, I finally got around to focusing on the Community Reinvestment Act, using Washington Mutual, which had pledged $375 billion in CRA lending as a case study of how the CRA subtly changed the culture of the lending business.

Two weeks later, I graphed data from the National Community Reinvestment Coalition showing over $4 trillion in CRA pledges by covered institions between 1996 and 2005, with $1.6 trillion pledged in 2004 alone.

On May 17, 2009 in VDARE.com, I focused on HMDA data on lending in California, where a great majority of defaulted dollars are found. I found that according to federal data, minorities got 77% of subprime dollars loaned out for home purchases in California in 2006, the worst year for subsequent defaults. Within California's 20 biggest metropolitan areas, there was a 0.89 correlation between minority share of subprime dollars in 2006 and default rates in Q1-2009.

And in VDARE.com on June 22, 2009, I profiled the largest lender not officially covered by the CRA -- Angelo Mozilo of Countrywide. And showed that Countrywide had been told by the Clinton Administration that they would be brought under the CRA if they didn't act like they were under the CRA. But, Mozilo quickly became a true believer, which accounts for Countrywide's $1 trillion dollar CRA-style pledge in early 2005.

My published articles are archived at iSteve.com -- Steve Sailer

April 12, 2009

Updated: Ground Zero of the Mortgage Meltdown



This stacked graph shows that mortgage lending to Latinos in Southern California's huge Riverside and San Bernardino counties, the Inland Empire, arguably now the foreclosure capital of America, grew 782% from $1.5 billion in 1999 to $13.5 billion in 2006.

Last October, my reader "Tino" introduced me to the federal government's Home Mortgage Disclosure Act database, which was set up to ensure that minorities are getting enough mortgages. It doesn't measure whether they're paying the mortgages back, and it's rather awkward to work with, but it's very useful for understanding how we got the Housing Bubble, which set off the Mortgage Meltdown, which set off the Global Crash.

As you know, somewhere approaching 7/8ths of defaulted mortgage dollars at the time of the economic crash in the fall of 2008 were lost in just four rapidly Hispanicizing states: California, Arizona, Nevada, and Florida. Indeed, California accounted for a sizable majority of foreclosed mortgage dollars by itself.

The above graph focuses on what has been perhaps the Ground Zero of the foreclosure crisis, Southern California's exurban Inland Empire, the Riverside-San Bernardino Metropolitan Statistical Area (Riverside and San Bernardino Counties). In the "Inland Empire, there were 112,284 foreclosure filings in 2008. The Inland Empire accounted for 3.6% of America's foreclosure filings in 2008 and likely approaching 10% of America's defaulted dollars due to the much higher home prices there at the peak of the Housing Bubble.

That was the most foreclosure filings of any metropolitan area in the country, more than the metro areas of greater Phoenix, Las Vegas, Tampa-St. Pete, Miami, Atlanta, New York City, Detroit, or even the giant Los Angeles / Long Beach area. At 8.02% of housing units in foreclosure, Riverside-San Bernardino endured the third highest foreclosure percentage in 2008, trailing only the Stockton and Las Vegas MSAs.

The point of trying to understand what happened is not to pin the blame on somebody, but to understand what happened.

Why has so much money been lost on foreclosures in the Inland Empire?

Well, because so much money was loaned out from, say, 2004 to early 2007.

The above graph, drawn from numbers from the federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act database, shows for 1999 to 2007 the aggregate of dollars of originations of both "conventional purchase" mortgages (HMDA's Table 4-2) as well as FHA, FSA/RHS, and VA loans (HMDA's Table 4-1).

(Caveats: The graph above doesn't include other types of loans such as nonoccupant, home improvement, or multi-occupant. Nor does it include refinancing. Refinancings are an important part of the Housing Bubble story, but the HMDA database doesn't seem to offer a way to distinguish between refinancings that make it likelier that the borrower will pay back -- e.g., refinancing from a higher variable rate to a lower fixed rate -- versus refinancings that make the loan more risky ... e.g., taking cash out of home equity and blowing it in Vegas. Moreover, Home Equity Lines of Credit are optional for the lender to report, so I don't know how useful HMDA's refinancing data are. Further, to simplify things, I've left off Asian, blacks, and other minorities, mixed couples, and mortgages where race is unknown.)

As over-simplifed as it is, the graphs still gives an informative overall picture of what went on in the Inland Empire that drove prices to absurd levels followed by foreclosures: a giant surge of lending to Hispanics, followed by a sobering up in 2007 (that no doubt accelerated in 2008).

The most obvious fact is that new mortgage dollars flowing to Hispanics in this sprawling California region increased 782% from $1.5 billion in 1999 to $13.5 billion in 2006. Is there a word in the English language for that? We have words like doubling for when something increases 100% and tripling for when it goes up 200%, but is "nontupling" even a word?

This huge increase in demand clearly had a big impact on home prices.

In contrast, the non-Hispanic white borrowing over 1999-2006 was up 134% (more than doubling). To be fair, white borrowing from 1999 to the white peak in 2005 was up 199% (a tripling), but white borrowing in the Inland Empire fell 22% from 2005 to 2006 as more prudent people ran for the hills.

In the Inland Empire in 1999, Hispanics received only 34% as much mortgage money as non-Hispanic whites did. By 2006, Hispanics received 127% as much as whites.

Clearly, there was a mortgage bubble among non-Hispanic whites, too, but white borrowing peaked earlier, in 2004-2005, when home prices weren't quite as ridiculous, and has declined in a somewhat less frantic fashion. In contrast, the Latino bubble peaked in 2005-2006 when home prices peaked, and then started to collapse in 2007. (The bursting of the subprime bubble is usually dated to about the beginning of August 2007, although there were major tremors in March 2007). In 2007, Hispanic borrowing crashed back down to $5.0 billion as financial institutions finally started to worry about loan quality. The dollars flowing to Hispanics fell 63% from 2006 to 2007, versus 38% among whites. In the more realistic atmosphere of 2007, Hispanic borrowing was back down to 75% of white borrowing.

By the way, black borrowing from 1999-2006 was up 464% and Asian/Pacific Islander borrowing was up 987% to $3.4 billion.

These increases in borrowing dollars may sound like some craziness restricted to one section of California, but last year Tino found similar patterns at the national level: mortgage lending for home purchases to Hispanics was up 691% nationally from 1999 to 2006. For blacks, the increase was 397%. For Asians 218%, and for whites about 100%.

So, the Inland Empire wasn't unique in the size of the growth in lending to Hispanics, it just had more to start with (40% in 2000, rising to 47% in 2006). Also, unlike Texas, the supply of homes in California is held back by lots of environmental regulations, so supply lags demand much more in California, making the state more susceptible to price spikes.

In short, as Yogi Berra might say, the Inland Empire is just like the whole country, only more so.

Using Ground Zero as an example, we can get a pretty good understanding of the causes of the Housing Bubble and subsequent Mortgage Meltdown.

What caused the increase in home prices?

First, population growth. The total population of the Riverside and San Bernardino Counties grew 22% from the Census on April 1, 2000 to 2006 (the Census Bureau's American Community Survey estimated population over the 2005-2007 time period). That 731,000 more people.

Hispanics accounted for 71% of the increase (or 521,000 additional people), Asians for 11%, whites for 10%, and blacks for 7%.

This population increase, largely driven by immigrant ethnicities, was seen as leading to every rising home prices, which were seen as as justifying ever riskier lending.

Second, and more important, as we see above, ever more lending was directed to ever more marginal borrowers.

Keep in mind that the Bush Administration was actively promoting riskier lending to minorities, such as by calling for the elimination of down payment requirements and the speeding up of the approval process, in the name of closing the "racial gap" in homeownership rates. Bush's speech at his October 15, 2002 White House Conference on Minority Homeowership was very similar to the speech Angelo Mozilo of Countrywide Financial gave in February 2003 at a Harvard conference.

Not surprisingly, first time homebuyers in California got zero downpayment mortgages less than 7% of the time in the late 1990s, but rocketed up to 33% in 2004 and 41% in 2006.

As late as 2002, the year that George W. Bush announced his goal of adding 5.5 million minority homeowners by 2010, Hispanics in the Inland Empire got only 42% as much in mortgage dollars as whites. From 2002 to 2006, however, lending to whites grew 42%, while lending to Hispanics grew 325% (more than a quadrupling).

A fraction of that growth in lending was of course due to population growth. The Hispanic population in the Inland Empire grew by 42% from the Census in 2000 to 2006, versus just 5% for whites, so let's look at mortgage dollars on a per capita basis to remove the population growth factor:

As you can see, in 2000, Hispanics in Riverside-San Bernardino received $1,417 per capita in mortgage dollars, 43% as much as whites, who got $3,324. In 2006, Hispanics got 117% as much as whites per capita: $7,725 per Hispanic versus $6,612 per white. Lending per capita to Hispanics in the Inland Empire was 5.5 times larger in 2006 than in 2000. Even more bizarrely, the rate at which mortgage money flowed per capita to Hispanics relative whites was 2.7 times greater in 2006 than in 2000.

Relative to whites, were Hispanics really 2.7 times more credit-worthy in 2006 than in 2000? No doubt there was some improvement in Inland Empire Latinos' incomes between 2000 and 2006, as they got more jobs and more pay as, say, mortgage brokers, real estate agents, home construction workers, furniture movers, and ... hey, do you notice the pattern here? Circular logic ...

Yet, Hispanics' ability to repay big mortgages certainly didn't improve 2.7 times relative to their white neighbors' ability to repay in just six years.

One might think that investors might have realized that Hispanics hadn't suddenly become a safe bet to repay huge mortgages. But, mortgage-backed securities hawkers like Angelo Mozilo of Countrywide Financial had a popular answer to doubts: that's just the redlining racist old way of thinking that kept Hispanics and blacks from owning homes at the same rate as whites.

If you wanted to be a big player in modern mortgage finance, like the much honored financial statesman Mr. Mozilo, you constantly repeated the Community Reinvestment Act cant about how America needs to loan more money to lower income and minority communities. In fact, the more you trumpeted how much you were lending to minorities, the more "regulatory cover" you enjoyed from pesky regulators asking questions about your high pressure boiler room operations.

If you wanted to make it big in the mortgage world but had politically incorrect doubts about all this, well, you kept them to yourself.

As Henry Canaday has pointed out:
Is it a coincidence that the biggest purely financial crisis in 75 years, which has cratered the world economy, is occurring because of massive losses in the one financing sector that is most heavily and obviously influenced by government pressure? The investment banks could have used their sophisticated models to underestimate the risks of all sorts of assets, but apparently these models only blew up when used on mortgage-backed securities.

Thanks for reading all this. If you found it useful, please feel free to send it around.

(Boring methodological note: Why I am I using 2000 in this graph and 1999 in the other one? 1999 is the earliest year offered in the federal HMDA database, so I use that. Unfortunately, we don't have detailed population breakdowns for 1999, but we do have them for April 1, 2000 -- the Census -- and for 2005-2007 -- the Census Bureau's American Community Survey.)

Second Boring Note: This is revised from the graph I had up on Sunday that showed just conventional private borrowing but not FHA and other government-aided lending. FHA lending was moderately important back in 1999, so I decided to include it.

My published articles are archived at iSteve.com -- Steve Sailer

December 30, 2010

Is there a Silent but Sensible Majority anymore?

A commenter on the PISA post below writes:
Well, the question I ask myself is what percent of the American population doesn't really deep down believe that HBD is probably a substantial factor in all these sorts of things...

Ten percent? Five percent? One percent? Zero percent?

The floor is open for people's guesses...

Back before I started participating 18 years ago in Internet discussions with anonymous participants, I would have agreed with these low estimates. All these years later, however ... I dunno. Maybe there is a Silent But Sensible Majority out there somewhere. Maybe.

To pick a random example of the quality of contemporary thought, here is an online discussion on Hacker News / Ycombinator about Tino's recent blog post at Super-Economy showing the PISA results when you adjust for demographics. Reading through it, it's hard to take away the impression that there are a lot of people out there who are well informed and hold reasonable views. Instead, you just see a lot of people getting intellectually snarled up in their own underwear. 

My approach has always been based around my sense that I'm not smart enough to juggle in my head complex wrong ideas. I need to find the simplest answers that work (but, as Einstein said, no simpler).

February 9, 2009

1990s FHA mortgage default rates by ethnicity



Thanks to reader Tino, who found this HUD document, here are the mortgage default rates by ethnicity for three vintages of 1990s FHA-insured mortgages. The sample size is 240,901 loans.

The Federal Housing Administration insures smaller-sized mortgages of low and moderate income folks upon appraisal, so this is roughly an apples to apples comparison of fairly similar borrowers. In other words, we're not comparing rich whites to poor minorities, at least not as much as if we were looking at the population as a whole.

Moreover, the FHA seems to have been somewhat more responsibly managed than most other sectors of the mortgage industry. And this data is from the 1990s when housing was a more boring sector of the economy than in the 2000s.

So, we're looking at representative, long term ethnic differences.

As you'll recall, late 1992 was when the Boston Fed, under the leadership of Richard Syron, published a warmly welcomed study claiming that mortgage lenders discriminated against minorities and should be loaning more to minorities. As Peter Brimelow asked in Forbes at the time, doesn't that mean minorities should have lower default rates?

But nobody in politics cared, and the study helped Syron get the top job at Freddie Mac, where he earned $38 million while piloting Freddie onto the rocks.

Default rates for 1992 vintage FHA-insured mortgages after 7 years:
White: 4.27%
Black: 10.81%
Hispanic: 13.18%

Default rates for 1994 vintage FHA-insured mortgages after 5 years:
White: 4.10%
Black: 9.14%
Hispanic: 9.47%

Default rates for 1996 vintage FHA-insured mortgages after 3 years:
White: 3.34%
Black: 6.93%
Hispanic: 6.99%

The source is
Analysis of FHA Single-Family Default and Loss Rates
Prepared for:
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
Office of Policy Development and Research
Prepared by:
Robert F. Cotterman
Unicon Research Corporation
March 2004

Even when adjusted for FICO scores and other objective factors related to credit risk, minority default rates still look worse. Cotterman concludes:
Blacks, Hispanics, and those in judicial foreclosure states and underserved areas have higher conditional loss rates, other things the same.

So, the changes in policy and worldview that led to the gigantic increases in mortgage lending to minorities seen over the last decade (with total mortgage dollars written per year increasing 691% for Hispanics and 397% for blacks from 1999 to the peak of the Housing Bubble in 2006) unsurprisingly led to world-historical levels of mortgage defaults in 2007-2009. After all, blacks and Hispanics were still defaulting at very high levels when they weren't getting as much mortgage lending. The law of diminishing marginal returns suggests that throwing more mortgage money at them wasn't going to improve their credit worthiness.

In 2004-2007, minorities received half of subprime mortgage dollars handed out. A new 2008 Boston Fed study shows minorities in Massachusetts getting foreclosed on subprime loans at twice the race of whites, suggesting that minorities accounted for a sizable majority of subprime dollars defaulted.

To the extent that we've had a debate over minority mortgage lending policy in the 18 months since the cratering of the subprime market (which we've barely had at all), it's been along the ideological lines of More Regulation vs. Less Regulation.

And yet, when we look at the federal policy over the last four Presidential terms, what we see is more aptly explained by a different paradigm than Regulation vs. Deregulation:

Who? Whom?

The Clinton Administration both strengthened some mortgage regulations and loosened others, all in the name of increasing minority homeownership. In complete contrast, tThe Bush Administration loosened some regulations and strengthened others, all with the intention of closing the racial homeownership gap.

The results of all this "affordable housing" social engineering was to first make housing unaffordable, and then, when the world finally woke up to the fact that it wouldn't be getting paid back on its mortgage lending, to smash the global economy.

My published articles are archived at iSteve.com -- Steve Sailer

July 26, 2005

Why the First Bush Administration Refused to Protect Our Borders:

A former INS official named Mark Reed testified to Congress in May that back during the Bush the Elder's Administration:

I was present at a high level strategy meeting between representatives of Federal Law Enforcement, DOD [Department of Defense], and the State Department regarding the urgency of sealing the Mexican border to stop drug smuggling. When DOD stated that they were capable of detecting and interdicting any intrusion, but could not distinguish between groups of migrants from drug smugglers until interdiction, the dialogue became difficult. When DOD refused to entertain the idea that they should only detain drug smugglers upon interdiction, the meeting was abruptly terminated. The safety valve that illegal immigration provided toward the stability of Mexico seemed to be a more compelling national security priority than drug smuggling.

That's certainly interesting now that word has come from the LA Times that the latest Bush administration is dunning corporations to build a war chest to "marginalize" conservative talk radio and other pillars of the GOP for opposing the President's amnesty & open borders immigration plan.

It's not surprising that the Bushes look out for the interests of the Mexican ruling class, since the Bush family has had ties of financial and friendship ties with the Mexican kleptocrats going back decades. I first wrote about this little-covered connection for UPI back in February 2001, and then in more depth for VDARE in January 2004:

Some of the First Dynasty's favorites have been criminals on a scale so extravagant as to scandalize even the long-suffering citizenry of Mexico.

Take Jorge Diaz Serrano. Jonathan Kwitny reported in a long exposé in Barron's ("The Mexican Connection of George Bush," September 19, 1988, requires Dow Jones' subscription to access):

"Without breathing a word to shareholders in his Houston oil-drilling company, Zapata Off-Shore Co., George Bush in 1960 helped set up another drilling operation employing Mexican front men and seemingly circumventing Mexican law. And he did so in association with Jorge Diaz Serrano, a now-convicted felon who has become a symbol of political corruption in a country with no shortage of contestants for that dubious distinction. In helping to launch … Permargo, Bush and his associates at Zapata teamed up with Diaz Serrano and a Mexican associate in camouflaging the 50% American ownership of Permargo."

George H.W. stood by his old partner:

"’I have high regard for Jorge,’ Bush was quoted as saying in People magazine in 1981. ‘I consider him a friend.’"

Diaz went on to bigger, if not better, things.

"Eventually, Diaz Serrano would take control of Permargo, before moving on to head Pemex, Mexico's government oil monopoly. Shortly after his five-year stint at Pemex, he would begin a five-year stint in jail, having defrauded the Mexican government of $58 million it is still trying to get back…"

Yet, today, Serrano seems like a quaint figure from Mexico's more innocent past. He was a public servant who merely feathered his own nest. Worse was to come.

The big difference between the nice clean corruption of the 1970s and today is the new pervasiveness of drug money, and its accompanying violence, among the Mexican elite...

The Bush family's most important Mexican friendship was with the Salinas family, whose scion Carlos ruled Mexico from 1988 and 1994, before fleeing to exile in Ireland to avoid being lynched by his furious countrymen. (For the lurid details on this depraved brood, see my article "Mexico's Corrupt White Elite.")

Julie Reynolds of El Andar noted,

"Bush Sr. met Carlos Salinas’s father, Raúl Salinas Lozano, back when the latter was Mexico’s commerce secretary. The families’ friendship has continued through the years. Raúl Salinas, the president’s brother, has told investigators that Jeb and Columba Bush joined him three times for vacations at his hacienda Las Mendocinas."


Jeb's host Raul, who was known as "Mr. 10%" in Mexico for demanding the Salinas family cut on all government contracts, is currently serving 27 years in the slammer for the assassination of PRI chairman Francisco Ruiz Massieu, his ex-brother-in-law. Raul's wife was arrested in Switzerland while attempting to withdraw $94 million in cash from their Swiss bank's safe deposit box.

Dubya's amigos in Texas, however, are not exactly migrant farm workers. As Julie Reynolds, assisted by Victor Almazán and Ana Leonor Rojo, wrote in El Andar:


"It was during those campaign years [of Bush the Elder] that George Junior bonded with many of his Latino allies in the state [of Texas] and made the friends he would later lean on when his political ambitions got into gear. By and large, the Latino alliances Bush touts so loudly these days are not social workers or school teachers, and they are certainly not working-class. Like most in W’s circle, they are Texas heavy-hitters who got rich from their astute blending of business and politics."


In a long, complex El Andar article entitled “LOS AMIGOS DE BUSH: The disturbing ties of some of George W. Bush’s Latino advisors," Reynolds amassed evidence to back her allegation that two of Bush's top Mexican-American backers in Texas are palsy-walsy with individuals linked to Mexico's feared Gulf narco cartel.

As George W. said numerous times in response to questions about illegal aliens, "Family values don't stop at the Rio Grande." (America, of course, does.) Here's one touching example of his assisting an undocumented worker in his struggle with the uncaring INS, as reported in El Andar by Reynolds and Eduardo Valle of Mexico City's El Universal newspaper:


"In the fall of 1991, George W. Bush asked his father, the President, to 'help out' on behalf of Enrique Fuentes León. … Fuentes León was living in the United States on a tourist visa that was about to expire."


What "family values" had brought this lawyer north of the Rio Grande?


"He had fled Mexico in 1989, after a highly-publicized case in which he was charged with bribing two judges in order to free a wealthy Acapulco businessman convicted of the rape and murder of a young child…"

"He remained free in the U.S. for three more years on an expired tourist visa, even though the Mexican government made an official extradition request on October 21, 1991. … By 1994, he had purchased more than $6 million in San Antonio real estate, and together with Texas publisher Tino Durán made moves to purchase the now-defunct San Antonio Light newspaper…"


When the INS was pestering Fuentes Leon in the early 90s, Duran, who calls himself "a friend and supporter of the Bush family," set up a meeting between the notorious fugitive and the future President of the United States to get him to intercede with the current President of the United States. Duran said:


"'I had sent him [George W.] a letter so he would know what it was all about, so he could decide if he wanted to help," Durán said. ‘And he called me and said, 'Sure, come on down and let’s talk about it.' ‘Enrique and I went down to his office and he called the President." George W. Bush asked President Bush if he could help Durán and 'his friend here.’ Durán says President Bush then asked Durán to send him a letter and said he would direct the information to the State Department."


What happened next?


"Fuentes León … was finally extradited to Mexico after a 1994 arrest for allegedly attempting to bribe an INS agent with $30,000… A courthouse employee said that Fuentes León showed up every day in a $200,000 car, followed by 'around 25' other vehicles…"


How could he afford that? Fuentes León is alleged by El Andar to be the "consigliero" of the Gulf narco cartel.


"Today, Fuentes León is again imprisoned in Mexico. This time it’s for a case in which he is charged in relation to the kidnapping and death of Nellie Campobello, 85, a famous former ballerina whose 13 year-old grave was found last year. The title to Campobello’s house has mysteriously appeared under the name of Fuentes León’s wife."

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My published articles are archived at iSteve.com -- Steve Sailer