One of the more          extraordinary documents relating to immigration is an essay for the          Center for Immigration Studies by the unusual figure Fredo Arias-King, a          Harvard MBA, a Sovietologist, and an advisor to Vicente Fox during his          2000 Presidential campaign. He was the first to point out to me that          the mother of Fox's first Foreign Secretary, Jorge G. Castaneda, and wife to a previous Mexican Foreign Secretary, was a Soviet          woman working a the UN and might have been a Soviet spy.
   
      Working for Fox, Arias-King met with 80 members of the U.S. Congress ,          and discussed immigration in detail with 50. Of those, 90% were          enthusiastic about boosting immigration from Mexico.
                            
                           Immigration          and Usurpation: Elites, Power, and the People’s Will
                           Fredo          Arias-King
                            
                   The  familiar reasons usually discussed by the critics were there: Democrats wanted  increased immigration because Latin American immigrants tend to vote Democrat  once naturalized (we did not meet a single Democrat that was openly against mass  immigration); and Republicans like immigration because their sponsors  (businesses and churches) do. But there were other, more nuanced reasons that we  came upon, usually not discussed by the critics, and probably more difficult to  detect without the type of access that we, as a Mexican delegation, had.
Their "Natural Progress" Of a handful of motivations, one of the main  ones (even if unconscious) of many of these legislators can be found in what the  U.S. Founding Fathers called "usurpation." Madison, Jefferson,  Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and others devised a system and embedded the  Constitution with mechanisms to thwart the "natural" tendency of the  political class to usurp power—to become a permanent elite lording over  pauperized subjects, as was the norm in Europe at the time. However, the  Founding Fathers seem to have based the logic of their entire model on the  independent character of the American folk. After reviewing the different  mechanisms and how they would work in theory, they wrote in the Federalist  Papers that in the end, "If it be asked, what is to restrain the House of  Representatives from making legal discriminations in favor of themselves and a  particular class of the society? I answer: the genius of the whole system; the  nature of just and constitutional laws; and above all, the vigilant and manly  spirit which actuates the people of America …"4 With all his emphasis on  reason and civic virtue as the basis of a functioning and decentralized  democratic polity, Jefferson speculated whether Latin American societies could  be governed thus.5
While Democratic legislators we spoke with welcomed the Latino vote, they seemed  more interested in those immigrants and their offspring as a tool to increase  the role of the government in society and the economy. Several of them tended to  see Latin American immigrants and even Latino constituents as both more  dependent on and accepting of active government programs and the political class  guaranteeing those programs, a point they emphasized more than the voting per  se. Moreover, they saw Latinos as more loyal and "dependable" in  supporting a patron-client system and in building reliable patronage networks to  circumvent the exigencies of political life as devised by the Founding Fathers  and expected daily by the average American.
Republican lawmakers we spoke with knew that naturalized Latin American  immigrants and their offspring vote mostly for the Democratic Party, but still  most of them (all except five) were unambiguously in favor of amnesty and of  continued mass immigration (at least from Mexico). This seemed paradoxical, and  explaining their motivations was more challenging. However, while acknowledging  that they may not now receive their votes, they believed that these immigrants  are more malleable than the existing American: That with enough care,  convincing, and "teaching," they could be converted, be grateful, and  become dependent on them. Republicans seemed to idealize the patron-client  relation with Hispanics as much as their Democratic competitors did. Curiously,  three out of the five lawmakers that declared their opposition to amnesty and  increased immigration (all Republicans), were from border states.
Also curiously, the Republican enthusiasm for increased immigration also was not  so much about voting in the end, even with "converted" Latinos.  Instead, these legislators seemingly believed that they could weaken the  restraining and frustrating straightjacket devised by the Founding Fathers and  abetted by American norms. In that idealized "new" United States,  political uncertainty, demanding constituents, difficult elections, and  accountability in general would "go away" after tinkering with the  People, who have given lawmakers their privileges but who, like a Sword of  Damocles, can also "unfairly" take them away. Hispanics would  acquiesce and assist in the "natural progress" of these legislators to  remain in power and increase the scope of that power. In this sense, Republicans  and Democrats were similar.
While I can recall many accolades for the Mexican immigrants and for  Mexican-Americans (one white congressman even gave me a "high five"  when recalling that Californian Hispanics were headed for majority status), I  remember few instances when a legislator spoke well of his or her white  constituents. One even called them "rednecks," and apologized to us on  their behalf for their incorrect attitude on immigration. Most of them seemed to  advocate changing the ethnic composition of the United States as an end in  itself. Jefferson and Madison would have perhaps understood why this is so—enthusiasm  for mass immigration seems to be correlated with examples of undermining the  "just and constitutional laws" they devised.
  
 What could  be motivating U.S. legislators to do the opposite, that is, to see their  constituents—already politically mature and proven as responsible and  civic-minded—as an obstacle needing replacement? In other words, why would  they want to replace a nation that works remarkably well (that Sarmiento was  hoping to emulate), with another that has trouble forming stable, normal  countries? Mexicans are kind and hardworking, with a legendary hospitality, and  unlike some European nations, harbor little popular ambitions to impose models  or ideologies on others. However, Mexicans are seemingly unable to produce  anything but corrupt and tyrannical rulers, oftentimes even accepting them as  the norm, unaffected by allegations of graft or abuse.8 Mexico, and Latin  American societies in general, seem to suffer from what an observer called  "moral relativism," accepting the "natural progress" of the  political class rather than challenging it, and also appearing more susceptible  to "miracle solutions" and demagogic political appeals. Mexican  intellectuals speak of the corrosive effects of Mexican culture on the  institutions needed to make democracy work, and surveys reveal that most of the  population accepts and expects corruption from the political class.9
A sociological study conducted throughout the region found that Latin Americans  are indeed highly susceptible to clientelismo, or partaking in patron-client  relations, and that Mexico was high even by regional standards.10 In a Latin  environment, there are fewer costs to behaving "like a knave," which  explains the relative failure of most Spanish-speaking countries in the  Hemisphere: Pauperized populations with rich and entrenched knaves. Montesquieu’s  separation-of-powers model breaks down in Latin America (though essentially all  constitutions are based on it) since elites do not take their responsibilities  seriously and easily reach extra-legal "understandings" with their  colleagues across the branches of government, oftentimes willingly making the  judicial and legislative powers subservient to a generous executive, and giving  the population little recourse and little choice but to challenge the system in  its entirety....
During the 18 months when I aided Fox’s foreign relations, in those meetings  with what became the new Mexican elite I do not recall so many discussions about  "what can we do to make tough decisions to reform Mexico," but rather  more "how can we get more concessions from the United States." Indeed,  Fox largely continued governing the country as his predecessors did, even  appointing as head of the federal police agency an Echeverría loyalist who was  allegedly involved in a deadly extortion attempt against a museum owner in 1972.  According to several leading world rankings on corruption, quality of  government, development, and competitiveness, Mexico actually worsened during  Fox’s presidency.14 Lacking internal or external pressure, the Mexican elites  have taken the path of least resistance, which is not the best outcome for the  country. Paradoxically, as happens in co-dependent relations, a firm but polite  defense of American interests by Washington would force the Mexican elites to  act and in the end (surely after a brief period of acrimonious recriminations)  would be beneficial for Mexico, much as the European Union’s tough accession  laws force elites in lesser-developed aspiring members (Spain in the 1980s and  Central European countries in the 1990s) to adopt painful and otherwise  politically unfeasible reforms that affect special interests but that benefit  average citizens. After all, the gap between elite and popular aspirations in  these countries is wider than in the United States, and on a broader range of  issues.
...This co-dependence is perhaps nowhere more evident than the personal  relations of the political classes of Mexico and the United States. When  speaking to these congressmen, we noticed an affinity toward the corrupt party  we were attempting to overthrow in Mexico. Several had visited Mexico and  apparently enjoyed lavish treatment from their hosts, even mentioning how some  of the things they enjoyed in Mexico would not be possible at home.
Even though the Mexican political class is notoriously corrupt, they can often  count on stronger support in Washington than can several more worthy world  leaders who are genuinely attempting to reform and improve their countries. The  history of the Bush family is symptomatic.
While snubbing pro-American reformers in the newly liberated Eastern Europe,  George H.W. Bush did go out of his way to accommodate Mexico and its leader  Carlos Salinas. Then-vice president and presidential candidate Bush openly  endorsed Salinas after the latter’s fraudulent election in 1988, a favor that  Salinas returned four years later when he met only with Bush and snubbed his  Democratic rival, Bill Clinton.
In April 2000, candidate George W. Bush followed in his father’s footsteps  when he tacitly but unambiguously endorsed the candidate of Salinas’s ruling  party against a then little-known opposition figure named Vicente Fox, perhaps  believing that the official-party candidate, the former secret-police chief  Francisco Labastida, would engage in a quid pro quo as president. Labastida  himself could not receive the honor in person on April 7, 2000, since he had  been fingered by the U.S. press as a possible target of the Drug Enforcement  Administration because of his record as governor. Instead, he sent his wife to  meet with Bush. Florida governor Jeb Bush knew for many years and apparently  also received lavish treatment from Salinas’s brother Raúl, before Raúl was  arrested on corruption and murder charges and spent the next decade in a Mexican  high-security prison. Bush Sr. had a long friendship and business relations with  Jorge Díaz Serrano, then director of the Mexican oil monopoly pemex, before he  was also arrested in a power struggle and accused of embezzling over $50  million. The long-time politicos of the Hank Rhon family, who were suspected of  laundering drug money and who continue to win elections in Mexico, were also  reported to have contributed money to the gubernatorial campaigns of George W.  Bush from a Texas bank they own.15 To their credit, no overtly illegal practice  has been proven against the Bush family in their dealings with Mexico, but the  appearance of admiration toward its ruling classes cannot be easily discounted.   [See my 2001 UPI article on the Bush family's ties to the Mexican ruling class.]
Though similar stories involving lesser politicians do not make headlines,  several lawmakers we met also had a special, giddy mystique of Mexico as a place  where moneyed leaders coexist with tame, grateful citizens. It would seem that  the American political class has a special affinity for their colleagues south  of the border. The appeal of their lavishness and impunity seems to strike a  positive chord in the American politicians, who perhaps resent being held  accountable by their citizens, who cannot become wealthy from politics, and who  may be removed from power "unfairly" and without warning.
 
My published articles are archived at iSteve.com -- Steve Sailer